TOP SECRET
OPERATION “ICEBERG”
(Enclosure No. 6 to A.C.1's No. 0109/12/5614 of 26th April, 1945)
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U.S.N. FIGHTER DIRECTION LIAISON OFFICER'S REPORT
HMS INDOMITABLE
18 April, 1945.
From: Fighter Direction Liaison Officer
To: Senior US Navy Liaison Officer, Task Force 57
Subject: Report of operations March 26 - April 18 1945.
1. During this period the British Fast Carrier Force, Task Force 57, operating under Commander Fifth Fleet, conducted air operations against Sakeshima Gunto and Northern Formosa. The primary object of these operations was the destruction of aircraft and air facilities, in order to prevent the enemy from staging aircraft through the above areas against our forces at Okinawa.
Strikes, Fighter Sweeps, and, when appropriate, Target-Caps were flown on nine days against Sakeshima Gunto and on two days against Northern Formosa targets.
2. During the above periods there were
146 Radar tracks considered possibly enemy
72 Interception not attempted because of distance, path of raid, weather, time of day, and, in many cases, because they were not threatening and were evaluated as more likely to be friendly than enemy.
74 Interceptions attempted; of this number
7 were missed; and
67 were completed:
of the 67 completed -
21 were on friendly planes
13 resulted in shoot downs of 23 enemy planes; and
30 resulted in sightings but no shoot downs because of weather
and/or superior performance of the enemy planes.
(the last figure may be inaccurate because of incomplete data.)
3. In general, British Fighter Direction compares favorably with that in the U.S. Fast Carrier Task Force. Their interceptions are good; and their evaluation and dissemination of information to the Force is excellent. They were handicapped by no proper night fighters and by insufficient numbers of day fighters. In the first few strike periods they rarely had more than 12 fighters over the force. Although this small number was efficiently used, many bogies could not be investigated and rarely were any investigated until they threatened to close the force. This delay meant that snoopers or transient aircraft were frequently not intercepted and that raids might not always be intercepted at maximum range. With the present Japanese tactics, and the necessity to destroy all Jap planes whenever and wherever they are, it is considered essential that sufficient fighters be over the force to enable each and every bogie to be intercepted at the earliest possible moment and still retain a strong fighter defence close to the fleet. As a result of the above, the plan in the future is to maintain a minimum of 20 VF over the force on strike days.
The success of the Fighter Direction, in spite of the lack of sufficient fighters, is in a large measure due to the skill of the Force Fighter Director.
4. The Homing of lost planes in the British carriers is definitely superior to that in the U.S. Fast Carriers for three reasons:
a) The VHF/DF greatly simplifies this problem and is considered absolutely essential to carrier warfare.
b) The British Have fewer planes on each circuit, further simplifying homing.
c) The British radio discipline, in the case of both pilots and ship personnel is better than in the U.S.N.
5. The British have adopted a modified system of radar pickets, using a fighter direction cruiser and a destroyer 30 miles out and slightly to one side of the target bearing line.
6. The British have tried several systems of Jack patrols and, at this time, usually use two sections of Fireflies, each covering a 90 degree sector in the direction from which attack is most likely.
7. British plane availability is woefully poor. This is due, in part to the lack of spares, the dearth of skilled technicians, the general lack of manpower, which tends to the inefficient employment of what skilled labor there is, and to battle fatigue, which becomes evident much more quickly in British carriers because of the lack of necessities, conveniences, and comforts when compared with U.S. carriers. Finally, from what has been observed of the Seafires, they are not worth carrying in a carrier force because of their lack of endurance, their poor results in combat, and their high percentage of deck crashes.
8. The British have mastered our air-sea-rescue methods and procedure and have learned to cooperate with our search planes. The latter does not seem apparent, in view of certain unfortunate and stupid incidents. On one occasion, the force was warned that a friendly was approaching on the proper bearing and to hold fire; a cruiser opened fire, anyway. On another occasion, a Privateer was intercepted, and identified at six miles; one of the interceptors, a Seafire without a radio, fired a burst at the plane. On the third occasion, an F4U division on Target Cap opened fire on a PB4Y-2 flying at sea level very close to the target.
(sgd.) H.A. ROWE
Lieutenant-Commander, U.S.N.