Putting perspective and precision into the armoured carrier debate
The essays of Slade and Worth on the NavWeaps website which compare Britain's armoured carriers to the performance of the United States' carriers have become the generally accepted "internet authority" on the subject. But scratching the surface of their work reveals the essays to be riddled with factual error, a lack of knowledge relating to Mediterranean and Atlantic operations, as well as minimal understanding of the circumstances of Task Force 57's operations off Sakishima Gunto.
The magnitude of such factual errors render their conclusions suspect.
The following rebuttals aim to set the record straight.
Submission by Jackie Edwards
HMS Victorious was not without its problems. One famous issue it is associated with is its rudder deficiencies, which prevented it from launching aircraft during a campaign in the Nicobar Islands. These rudder deficiencies actually impacted the Victorious on more than one occasion, which, while not harming the overall legacy of the craft, may have had a much deeper impact…
Okinawa naval garrison commander Adm Ota's land-based radars were popping up and taking snapshots of the CAP array and providing radio beacons for the "Kyushu to Okinawa" and "Kyushu to Okinawa" aerial highways. (The former was in Kume Jima and the latter was in Naha.) These CAP "Snap shot" reports were sent by undersea cable to Kyushu and Formosa…
You've provided a compelling argument in your refutation to Slade's (et al) claim that armored flight decks were not very useful or even counterproductive. When features are carried into the future, this usually means they have merit.
However, you may have overstepped in claiming that the armored carriers could hold nearly as many planes ton-for-ton by parking them on the flight deck and do so without compromising stability and by suggesting that the Illustrious Class carriers had multiple superior defense systems to the Yorktowns…
From David Anderson: This is my rebuttal to the comment that "the American carriers were more vulnerable to kamikaze attack than their British counterparts," from The Man Who Once Was Whizzer White, by Dennis J. Hutchinson (The Free Press, New York: 1998), Page 190.
My first reaction to Mr. Hutchinson’s text was, “Why bring this up now? You haven’t written about this before, but you choose to make an issue of it at this point!”
Yes, British carriers had armored (armoured) flight decks. The American (and American-built) carriers had a thin metal deck that supported the wooden flight deck. But this is only one side of the controversy.
The U. S. Navy’s point of view was that their aircraft carriers had more airplanes, which could be refueled more times, before having to meet the service force. Consequently, the USN carrier could stay on station for a longer time, fly more sorties, and do more damage to the enemy before having to replenish aviation fuel, ship’s fuel, aircraft, pilots, and food...
It's one of the war's most dramatic photographs: Illustrious's steaming and smoking flight deck as the devastating attacks of January 10, 1941, unfold.
A crewman, slightly off balance, stands amid the fumes near the ship's centreline - starkly framed by the toppled lift platform jutting out of the smoking aft lift well.
Officers and crew - their reflection's shining clearly on the slick-wet flight deck - cluster against the island and the edges of the ship. Probably to avoid burning their feet on the hot armour directly above the aft hangar fires.
What does this tell us?
Post on Yorktown airgroups separated out of the "Debunking Slade & Worth's essays" section by Robert Morgan.
Overall, I really respect your analysis. One area I would debate, however, regards the load out of the Yorktowns in the early war period. The spares were usually pretty much ready to go, not crated up or in parts. They were typically hung from the hangar deck overhead in fully assembled condition. So, it wouldn’t take long to lower a spare from the overhead and get it ready to go. These spares are probably best looked at as full members of the air group, with minimal time needed to get them up and operational, although they were typically administratively assigned to the ship herself, and not her air group.
Putting perspective and precision into the armoured carrier debate
The essays of Slade and Worth on the NavWeaps website which compare Britain's armoured carriers to the performance of the United States' carriers have become the generally accepted "internet authority" on the subject. But scratching the surface of their work reveals the essays to be riddled with factual error, a lack of knowledge relating to Mediterranean and Atlantic operations, as well as minimal understanding of the circumstances of Task Force 57's operations off Sakishima Gunto.
The magnitude of such factual errors render their conclusions suspect.
The following rebuttals aim to set the record straight.
